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Financial incentives (pay for performance) for clinicians are an
intuitively reasonable solution to the well documented gaps
between evidence based best practice and routine care.1 They
were fundamental to the 2004Quality andOutcomes Framework
(QOF), which paid primary care physicians in England up to
25% of their income for achieving 147 performance indicators,
including 76 clinical targets (such as recording smoking
behaviour, keeping blood pressure and cholesterol levels below
targets, and spirometry in patients with asthma).2 Whether the
cost (around an extra £1bn (€1.3bn; $1.6bn) annually) was
justified has been contested.3 Similar attempts include over 170
initiatives in public and private US hospitals,4 and Australia’s
Medicare Practice Incentives Program,which targets quality in
primary care.5
To aid those making the difficult and costly decision of whether
and how to use a financial incentive, we reviewed the evidence
on the positive and negative effects of financial incentives and
developed a simple checklist.
Synopsis of the evidence
Current evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives is
modest and inconsistent. Outside healthcare, early research
suggested that financial incentives improved employee
motivation and performance, but a meta-analysis found this was
not always true for complex systems, where careful design and
integration within the organisation was needed.6 An overview
of four systematic reviews in healthcare found none had
examined the effect on patient outcomes.7 Financial incentives
had mixed effect on consultation or visit rates (improving 10
of 17 outcomes from three studies) and generally improved
processes of care (41 of 57 outcomes from 19 studies) and
referrals and admissions (11 of 16 outcomes from 11 studies)
as well as reducing prescribing costs (28 of 34 outcomes from
10 studies).7 However, they were ineffective in improving
compliance with guidelines (improving five of 17 outcomes
from five studies). A Cochrane review of seven eligible studies
in primary care found that financial incentives were effective
for some outcomes in some settings but concluded that there
was “insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of
financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health
care.”8
The studies paid insufficient attention to effect modifiers such
as the nature and complexity of the target behaviour, the size
andmethod of the incentive, the health professional group being
targeted, and the organisational environment. While incentives
for individuals have been extensively examined, group rewards
are less well understood.4 Theoretically, the costs of the
incentives might be repaid by reduced costs, but evidence on
cost effectiveness is limited.4 Finally, and most crucially, most
studies gathered few data on potential unintended consequences,
such as attention shift, gaming, and loss of motivation.
The checklist
If all the answers are “yes” to the first six questions (part
A)—which help decide whether a financial incentive should be
considered at all—then the three questions in part B help with
the design of the potential incentive programme. If the answer
to any of the first six questions is no, then financial incentives
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should be postponed while further information is sought, or
abandoned if there is no likely benefit.
Part A: Is a financial incentive appropriate?
1. Does the desired clinical action improve patient
outcomes?
Any incentive targeting change in clinician behaviour requires
strong evidence that the desired clinical action will improve
patient outcomes (at the level of “strong recommendations” set
out by the Grading of Recommendations Assessment,
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) group; www.
gradeworkinggroup.org). For treatments this will generallymean
consistent results from high quality randomised trials or a
systematic review. Guideline recommendations alone are usually
insufficient: they may be based on weak evidence or may not
have been developed using an evidence based process (even
guidelines from the World Health Organization9 and American
College of Cardiology and American Heart Association10).
This problem is shown by the financial incentives to achieve a
glycated haemoglobin target of <7% in diabetic patients. The
target is based on prognostic data from cohort studies and the
UK Prospective Diabetes Study in the 1990s, even though three
concurrent large trials subsequently showed no benefit compared
with more liberal targets. One large trial was stopped early
because of higher mortality with the lower target (7%),11 leaving
the “correct” target uncertain because most intervention patients
did not achieve even the 7% target.
2. Will undesirable clinical behaviour persist
without intervention?
Before contemplating a change we should obtain data on the
extent of the problem and trends suggesting the problem is not
resolving (from audits, surveys, and registry studies). The types
of undesirable behaviour (box) are underuse of clearly indicated
interventions in eligible patients, overuse of ineffective or
harmful interventions, and misuse (improper or inefficient
administration of indicated care to eligible patients or care given
to ineligible patients).
Thresholds for underuse or overuse of care should vary
according to the effect of the proposed change on patient
outcomes, patient eligibility, and the complexities and costs of
providing that care. Thus an effective, easily administered, safe,
and inexpensive treatment should have a low threshold for
underuse, and vice versa.
3. Are there valid, reliable, and practical
measures of the desired clinical behaviour?
Measures for incentives need to be valid (measuring what is
intended) and reliable (precise and reproducible) and preferably
capable of independent verification and routine collection.
Surrogate measures can be dangerous if “improvement” does
not translate into patient outcomes. For example, clinics
randomised to a financial incentive showed improved recording
of smoking status and provision of advice compared with control
clinics but without any difference in the proportion of patients
who tried to stop smoking.12 The measure should be practical,
and the cost of collecting the data must be outweighed by the
benefits to patients.We found no studies on the cost of collecting
clinical indicators.
4. Have the barriers and enablers to improving
clinical behaviour been assessed?
Several barriers or enablers—including the nature of the
intervention, its mode of dissemination, the clinicians, their
environment, and the attitudes of patients—interact to determine
whether, and how quickly, any change in clinical practice
happens and whether it is sustained.
These barriers and enablers need to be understood before the
change technique is designed. This may need a literature review,
surveys, focus groups, or a combined approach.13 Subsequently,
methods can be devised to overcome identified barriers, although
little is known about the most effective approaches to tailoring
incentives according to desired change in delivery of care.14
Thus, financial incentives may compensate for the additional
costs of providing a service, act as a stimulus for behaviour
change, or motivate practitioners or organisations with the
economic reward.
5. Will financial incentives work, and better than
other interventions to change behaviour, and
why?
Clinical behaviour can be changed by many interventions,
including education, audit and feedback, opinion leaders,
reminders, collaborative quality improvement, regulatory
approaches, public reporting of performance, and financial
incentives. Systematic reviews reach common conclusions:
much of the evidence is weak, reporting of interventions is
incomplete, no strategy is consistently effective, and individual
studies show effect sizes that are small to modest—around
5-10%—with unpredictable variation.13Rarely are sustainability
and cost reported. All this makes deciding when financial
incentives are a better choice than other methods challenging.
The large psychology literature shows the importance of
alternative drivers to clinician behaviour, especially intrinsic
motivation.15 Worse, external rewards such as targets and
incentives can actually reduce intrinsic motivation. Although
reducedmotivationwas not reported among general practitioners
in England after the introduction of QOF payments, it was seen
among practice nurses.16
6. Will benefits clearly outweigh any unintended
harmful effects, and at an acceptable cost?
Financial incentives may have unintended consequences.17
Possible downsides include the following:
Attention shift—Incentives in one practice area may decrease
activity in another. The introduction of targets for waiting
times in English emergency departments resulted in staff
being recruited from other areas in the hospital and the
cancellation of elective surgery lists.18 General practitioners
in the UK decreased their average time in clinical teaching
after QOF was introduced.19
Gaming is behaviour aimed at obtaining strategic advantage
without necessarily realising a patient benefit. For example,
16% of English emergency departments reported directly
manipulating the data to appear that they had met the four
hour target for discharging or transferring patients.18A related
practice is “upcoding”—stretching the classification of
clinical episodes to obtain maximum remuneration.
Harm to the patient-clinician relationship was found when
consultations becamemore centred on achievingQOF targets
than on what the patient wanted.9 Clinicians also became
reluctant to attend patients for whom QOF targets would
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Examples of undesirable clinical behaviours
Underuse
• Warfarin prescribing in patients with atrial fibrillation
• Use of β blockers in heart failure
• Secondary prevention (statins, angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors) after acute myocardial infarction
• Immunisation, metformin in obese diabetic patients
• Prophylaxis for deep vein thrombosis in orthopaedic surgery
Overuse
• Unnecessary investigation of low risk patients with atypical chest pain (troponin, stress testing, computed tomography of coronary
arteries)
• Repeated cholesterol testing
• Use of antibiotics in viral respiratory tract infections
• Prolonged use of nebulised bronchodilators in exacerbations of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
Misuse
• Inappropriate use of psychotropic drugs in elderly patients
• Mistimed antibiotic prophylaxis in surgical patients
have been difficult to achieve,19 and informed consent was
bypassed in the imperative to attain targets.19
Reduction in equity—Inequalities in the achievement of
targets by age, sex, and ethnic group persisted after the
introduction of QOF payments despite their improvement
overall.20
Part B: Implementation
7. Are systems and structures needed for the
change in place?
Realisation of the desired behaviour may depend on overcoming
barriers to change. For example, although an Australian
immunisation incentive paid to primary care practices was
effective in most areas, it did not work in some remote areas
because there was no reliable cold chain supply.21 Funding for
necessary infrastructure should precede funding for the
incentive.
Some common requirements are a communication strategy about
the changes; information systems for monitoring achievement
of milestones; endorsement from key bodies (particularly health
professional groups); and support from key opinion leaders with
examples of excellent practice.
8. How much should be paid, to whom, and for
how long?
Poor design of financial incentives may explain their low
effectiveness.4 They may be more successful if clinicians are
involved in their design and operation; performance targets and
measures are seen to be valid, precise, up to date, and attainable;
and the opportunity costs in monitoring data collection are
acceptable.4
The largest improvements come from the payment of individuals
and teams rather than organisations.4 Distributing payment to
clinical team members equitably retains team cohesion and
cooperation.4
Common sense dictates that the size of the financial incentive
should relate to the effort required to attain the desired
behaviour, but this relation is unclear from empirical studies.
More frequent payments may be more effective if the drivers
are the same as for the feedback of performance. To reduce the
risk of budget overspend, as occurred with QOF payments in
England, capped payments should be considered.
If targets are set too high then poor performers may be
discouraged; if set too low, high performers attain the targets
so easily that funds are wasted. Perhaps the best returns on
investment come from targeting people with the poorest
performance and rewarding the extent to which they narrow the
gap between desired and current performance.22
Finally, some incentives may lead to long term structural
changes that persist, such as the setting up of computer systems,
but many behavioural changes seem to revert when incentives
are withdrawn.23
9. How will the financial incentives be delivered?
The measure used to ascertain the financial rewards (question
3 above) must set out the practical processes, with financial
incentives closely aligned. The rules for this must be explicit,
while retaining flexibility.
Discussion
We have assumed that the clinical changes and costs would be
monitored, and hence have not included a possible tenth
question: “What mechanisms are in place to review effects?”
The table⇓ gives some examples of applying the checklist. All
of these programmes had at least one “no” in the first six
questions, whichmay be acceptable in some contexts. However,
a “no” for questions 1 and 2 is a particular concern. Few
programmes seem to have examined barriers to change or
compared the effects and costs with those of alternative ways
of changing behaviour.
Policymakers have recognised the uncertainties and downsides
of financial incentives, reflected by the large scale evaluations
of the major UK and US programmes that have contributed to
the evidence behind our checklist. However, a decision to
implement an incentive should include a critical assessment
beforehand. Our checklist could help in that assessment. In
particular items 1-3 should have a “yes” on a first pass. Items
with a “no” or “unclear” answer suggest the need for further
background checks or pilot studies, and if a decision is still
made to proceed then monitoring and evaluation seem
warranted.
Financial incentives assume that paying more for a service will
lead to better quality or additional capacity, or both. However,
because money is only one of many internal and external
influences on clinical behaviour, many factors will moderate
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the size and direction of any response. The evidence on whether
financial incentives are more effective than other interventions
is often weak and poorly reported. As in the QOF, new incentive
programmes should include research to examine the impact,
downsides, and cost effectiveness of incentives, and this should
include evaluation of the comparative effectiveness of different
strategies in different contexts. Such research should also include
long term follow-up, since behaviourmay revert when incentives
are withdrawn.23 24
While some commentators and policy makers believe financial
incentives can reduce the delay between new evidence and
changes to clinical practice, there are many pitfalls. The
proposed checklist is aimed at guiding implementers of financial
incentives past some of these pitfalls.
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Table
Table 1| Application of financial incentives checklist to some real examples
Performance pay for low
performing physicians¶
Hospital care of myocardial
infarction, heart failure, and
pneumonia§
QOF haemoglobin
A1c target‡
Asthma action plan
(3+)†
Childhood
immunisation in
Australia*Checklist item
Is there a remediable problem in routine clinical care?
Yes—Trials and
observational studies show
clear relation between
screening for diabetes and
breast and cervical cancer
and vaccination and
improved outcomes
Yes—Trials and
observational studies show
clear relation between
evidence based processes of
care and improved patient
outcomes
No—Indirect evidence
only that lower HbA1c
predicts better patient
outcomes; large trials
were underway
Yes—Trials showed
written action plans
improve control and
reduce emergency visits
Yes—Trials and
observational studies
show net benefits for
most vaccines covered
1. Does the desired clinical
action improve patient
outcomes?
Yes—Difference between
low and high performing
physicians persisted despite
both groups improving
No—Studies showed
improvements for half of
proposed measures, with at
least 90% reaching target
No—Trends showed
improving control
before incentives
Yes—Sustained low use
of action plans had been
documented
Yes—Immunisation
rates had been
consistently dropping
2. Will the undesirable
clinical behaviour persist
without intervention?
YesYesYesYes—Copy of planYes—Immunisation
easily recorded
3. Are there valid and
reliable measures of the
desired clinical behaviour?
NoNoNoNot examinedNo—Cold chain failure
in rural areas not
identified
4. Have barriers and
enablers to improving
clinical behaviour been
assessed?
Possibly—Studies suggest
low performing physicians
respond better to payments,
but also to other quality
improvement strategies
No—Monitoring and quality
improvement collaboratives
yield similar, if not greater,
improvements
UnclearProbably—Similar
financing of
immunisation had
worked
Uncertain5. Will financial incentives
work better than other
interventions to change
behaviour, and why?
Yes—Funds given to
providers were small and
the gains clinically
significant
Unclear cost effectiveness;
improvement gains were
modest
NoUnclear—Low use of
action plans even after
incentives meant costly
roll out with no impact
Unclear cost
effectiveness
6. Will benefits clearly
outweigh any unintended
harmful effects, and at an
acceptable cost?
Design and implementation
YesYesYes—most practices
had computerised
systems
YesMostly—but cold chain
was a problem in remote
areas.
7. Are systems and
structures needed for the
change in place?
Extra 1.5–7.5% of base
fees, plus $3000 bonus for
improved quality scores
Hospitals with a quality score
in the top 10% received a 2%
incentive bonus; those in the
10-20% band received a 1%
bonus. In the third year a
penalty was applied to low
performers
National QOF system
rewarded practices
achieving targets, but
behaviour reverted
when target removed
Patients?— GPs were
paid but patients were
reluctant to attend for the
3 visits required
Paying clinicians worked
while incentives were in
place
8. How much should be
paid, to whom, and for how
long?
Directly to providersUnclear how payments to
hospitals were distributed to
units
Direct payment to
practices
Direct payment to
practices
Direct payment to
practices
9. How will the financial
incentives be delivered?
*The General Practice Immunisation Incentive scheme was introduced in 1998 (www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/provider/incentives/gpii/index.jsp).21
†Asthma 3+ (www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/provider/incentives/pip/files/2709-2-asthma-incentive-guidelines.pdf). The 2011 financial incentive to increase use of
action plans had disappointing results, perhaps because payment to the doctor required three patient visits, which well asthma patients were reluctant to do. Other
barriers include insufficient trained practice nurses and asthma educators, spirometers, and practice registers.
‡The English Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 2 3 target was later revised because of concerns about unintended consequences.
§Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services premier health quality incentives demonstration.24 A three year programme in 265 not-for-profit volunteer hospitals
that targeted care of five conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, coronary artery bypass grafting, and joint replacement of the hip and
knee, but only the first three improved. Long term mortality was unaffected.
¶ A four year study comparing low performing physicians in two US preferred provider organisation health plans.22
Rewards were based on seven clinical quality indicators. The pay for performance group had significantly greater increases than controls for cervical cancer
screening, HbA1c testing, mammography, and varicella vaccine after three years.
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